Rome [and Arabia]

This entry explores the military, political, diplomatic and commercial relations between the Roman Empire and the Arabian Peninsula.

Since the reconnaissance missions of Alexander the Great to the Arabian coasts in 323 BCE (Arr., Anab. 7.20), and the establishment of the Hellenistic kingdoms of the Ptolemies and the Seleucids, knowledge of these regions increasingly spread to the Greek and then the Roman worlds. From the late third century BCE (at the latest), Roman visions of Arabia mainly amounted to the country’s geographical remoteness, its immense riches, urban culture, beautiful young women, and, above all, the production of aromatica, frankincense in particular (e.g., Plaut., Persa 4.3 and Trinummus 4.2, Strabo 16.4.22, Plin. NH 12.30-32, Amm. 23.6.45-47). Rome’s interest in the Southern Arabian kingdoms was thus mainly inspired, from the outset, by economic and fiscal considerations.

During the 1st century BCE, Rome significantly increased its influence in and around the Red Sea basin. In the wake of Pompey’s organization of the East (64 BCE), the Nabataean kingdom was turned into a Roman ally. Egypt became a Roman province in 30 BCE, and military expeditions were sent to South Arabia in 26/25 or 25/24 BCE, as well as to the kingdom of Meroë on the African side just a year later. Rome thus developed a geopolitical outlook that involved the entire Red Sea basin and long-distance trade with East Africa and India.

The Roman Invasion

Soon after the conquest of the Nile valley, Augustus, Rome’s first sole ruler (30 BCE-14 CE), gave orders to the second governor of Egypt, Aelius Gallus (26-24 BCE), to prepare a military campaign by land and sea to South Arabia (Strabo 16.4.22-24; RgdA 26; Jos. AJ 15.317; Plin. NH 6.32.157–162; Dio 53.29). The geographer Strabo, a contemporary from Pontic Amaseia, records that it was the Roman ruler’s intention ‘either to conciliate or subdue the Arabs (…)'. He hoped to acquire either affluent friends, or to overcome affluent enemies. Strabo appears to be quoting official positions, for he was in Gallus’s retinue immediately before the campaign and because Augustus himself, in his res gestae, claims to have followed a practically identical strategy: ‘I extended the boundaries of all those provinces of the Roman people which had neighbouring peoples who did not obey our orders’ (RgdA 26.1). The objective thus was to surround all provinces by ‘friends’ (amici) of Rome.

It thus appears that outright conquest was not the only positive conclusion imaginable of the South Arabian campaign, but that the (forcible) establishment of friendly political relations (amicitia) between Rome and South Arabian kingdoms was, from the outset, an equally desirable outcome with respect to imperial designs. Such a solution could satisfy Rome’s desire to maintain a certain degree of local control without having to pay for the costs of an occupying army. Peace and order in the region would benefit long-distance trade and thereby guarantee the Roman treasury’s revenues from the 25 % import taxes.

The prospect of a campaign to South Arabia immediately raised Roman hopes for fabulous booty (Hor., Carm. I.29). Strabo even claims that Augustus’ plans were equally motivated by the legendary wealth of the Arabs, which they accrued by trading aromatics and precious stones for silver and gold (Strabo 16.4.22. Cf. Plin., NH 6.32.162). Nevertheless, the Arabian campaign was hardly a mere quest for personal glory and profit, but part of a more comprehensive scheme.

Gallus’s expeditionary force consisted of 10,000 foot soldiers from the Roman army in Egypt (i.e., the majority of the occupying troops in the Nile valley). It was joined by 1000 soldiers from Nabataea and 500 soldiers from Judaea. The powerful Nabataean courtier Syllaeus (second only to the king) served as a guide and advisor to the Romans. The campaign had its initial base at the Nabataean port of Leuke Kome in the Northern Hijaz. Unfortunately, the exact course and stages of the expedition, as well as nearly all the military details get reported in a scrappy fashion. Even the outcome remains a matter of debate among scholars. The Roman forces appear to have advanced as far as the Sabaean capital of Maʾrib. Moreover (but not generally accepted), the Periplus Maris Erythraei from the mid-first cent. CE reports the ransacking (if true, probably by sea) of the harbour of Aden by Augustus (PME 26. Cf. also Philost., HE. 3.4).

The hardships and deaths caused by the hot climate and the difficulties of moving an army through the challenging landscape, as well as the failure to procure vast amounts of booty, no doubt contributed to the negative assessment of the campaign as related by Strabo and Dio. Strabo also sought to blame Syllaeus, whom he intensely disliked, for a major military blunder. Pliny’s judgement was far less adverse. Augustus counted the campaign among his military accomplishments. Even Strabo conceded that the campaign was not entirely without success (cf. also Gal., Peri antidoton 2.17 (14,203 Kühn)). At any rate, the geographer also reports increased maritime traffic with India since the age of Augustus, as well as large numbers of Roman and other foreign merchants based at the Nabataean capital of Petra (Strabo 2.5.12, 16.4.21), thus indicating Roman satisfaction over the development of long-distance trade with South Arabia and beyond (cf. e.g., Maraqten-Qatabanic 1 and R 1850).

A building for the imperial cult in Carian Aphrodisias, which was no doubt modelled on a similar but much larger and now lost construction in Rome, included among various other peoples subjugated to Rome, a now lost figure representing Arabs, as made clear by its Greek inscription (SEG 31, 930). No other Roman campaign ever ventured into South Arabia again (Dio 53.29). There does, however, seem to have been an abortive attempt in 1 CE by Augustus’ grandson C. Caesar (Plin., NH 2.67.168, 6.31.141, 6.32.160), and Roman soldiers were involved in several (minor?) military actions in the Southern Red Sea in the second century (AE 2005, 1640; AE 2007, 1659; Arist., Or.Rom. 70).

Friendship with Rome

The royal dynasty that eventually controlled the kingdom of Sabaʾ after the Roman invasion also ruled the region of Ḥimyar with its capital at Ẓafār, from where it appears to have hailed. Ḥimyar may even have supported the Roman campaign from the outset. One of its kings, Charibaël (probably Karibʾīl Watār Yuhanʿim, c. mid-first century CE), was ‘a friend of the Roman emperors (φίλος τῶν αὐτοκρατόρων), thanks to continuous embassies and gifts’ (PME 23). The exact circumstances of how the kings of Sabaʾ and Ḥimyar became Roman allies (amici) is not on record, but was probably a consequence of the Augustan invasion. Thus, a series of Sabaean silver coins bear the portrait of the Roman ruler Augustus. Most likely, therefore, they were minted by a pro-Roman government in Sabaʾ some time between 24 BCE and 14 CE. A fragmentary bilingual, Latin and Greek, funerary inscription of the Roman horseman Publius Cornelius was found at Barāqish (AE 1980, 890 = SEG 27, 1005), where the Roman expeditionary forces established a garrison during the invasion (Strabo 16.4.24). As Roman soldiers never set up their gravestones in enemy territory, the fragment strongly suggests that Romans now considered Barāqish a permanent part of the Roman sphere. Unless the fragment was brought from afar (for which there is no evidence or particular likelihood), it can be safely assumed that the invasion was followed by a period of Roman hegemony, and, possibly, a short-lived Roman occupation.

Strabo reproached Syllaeus, among other things, for having tried to establish Nabataean control over the kingdom of Sabaʾ. A Nabataean-Sabaean bilingual inscription from 7/6 BCE, found at the great Almaqah sanctuary at Ṣirwāḥ, with a dedication to the chief Nabataean divinity Dūsharā is therefore of interest. Its dating formula only mentions the Nabataean king, but no Sabaean authority. It has been suggested that the Ṣirwāḥ inscription was set up by the commander of a local Nabataean garrison. Unfortunately, the inscription itself does not mention its author’s rank or function. Two Ancient South Arabian inscriptions (Ja 772 and T.02.B 22) from Maʾrib and Tamnaʿ apparently refer to the Roman expedition yet, remarkably, without using hostile terminology. Two graffiti at Najrān mention military actions against the Nabataeans but their date is uncertain. At any rate, the epigraphic and archaeological evidence makes it very clear that, less than two decades after the invasion, Rome’s Nabataean allies had firmly established themselves in South Arabia where they exercised considerable influence.

A “Roman” Red Sea

Details of the further evolution of Rome’s amicitia with the rulers of Sabaʾ and Ḥimyar (and other South Arabian rulers?) are somewhat obscure. Statements from Greek and Latin authors suggest that Rome considered itself to be increasingly in control of the entire Red Sea basin (Strabo 16.4.21; Jos., BJ 2.16.4; Tac., Ann. 2.61; Arist., Or. Rom. 70 and 82; Eutr. Brev. 8.3.2; Festus 14-15; Jord., Rom. 268). Since the first century, Rome entertained warships in the Red Sea (O.Petr. 279 and 296, both mid-1st cent., and QQ inv.P.004 from 93 CE). Yet good relations with most neighbouring states and polities appear to have continued. Recurring direct diplomatic and economic contacts between South Arabia (Sabaʾ and Ḥimyar; Qatabān) and various parts of the Empire (Egypt; Asia Minor; Arabia; Palmyra; Italy; Rome) are recorded during the next centuries CE (e.g., PME 23: ca. mid-1st c.; Plin., NH 12.31.56-7: ca. 2nd half of 1st cent.; Maraqten-Qatabanic 1: 1st cent.; SEG 34, 1594: 57; I.Portes 65: 70; R 1850: 1st / 2nd cent.; Ja 931: 220-230; Riyām 2006-17: 260-70; Philost., HE 3.4: 340-350). Two citizens of Aden, on business in first-century Egypt, erected monuments at Koptos with Greek inscriptions for the good health of the Roman emperor (SEG 34, 1594; I.Portes 65), while the statue of a Roman emperor with a Greek inscription stood at an unknown location in the Ḥimyarite capital at Ẓafār in the 2nd or 3rd c. CE (SEG 63-1634).

The creation of provincia Arabia in 106 CE entailed the establishment of a Roman garrison and military infrastructure. Trajan (98-117 CE) appears to have taken the opportunity not only to extend the navigable channels in Egypt connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea (ca. 112 CE), but also to further increase Rome’s presence and naval capabilities in the mare rubrum (Eutrop., Brev. 8.3.2; Festus 14-5; Jord., Rom. 268). Two Latin inscriptions from the main island of the Farasān archipelago from the first half of the second century illustrate this development. They record military construction work and the presence of a garrison of legionary soldiers from the new province of Arabia on the island (around 120 CE). New buildings were constructed when the garrison was replaced in 144 CE by legionary and auxiliary soldiers from Egypt (AE 2005, 1640 and 2007, 1659). The main task of these soldiers was no doubt to control and to protect the maritime trade routes through the Bab al-Mandab. In or shortly before 144 CE, Roman troops were engaged in a peace-keeping mission somewhere in the Red Sea basin (Arist., Or. Rom. 70). Two dedications by Roman soldiers from the late second / early third centuries found in Capua and Rome to a god named Jupiter Sabaeus may reflect the continued existence of such missions to the Southern Red Sea (AE 1953, 26; ILS 4085). At any rate, it is very likely that the Aksumite king (Gadara?) who invaded the Arabian coast between the Roman province of Arabia and the kingdom of Sabaʾ in the very early third century did so with the consent or the active encouragement of both Rome and the ruler of Sabaʾ (OGIS 199 = SEG 42,1646).

Late Antiquity

The Empire’s interest in controlling the Red Sea basin beyond its provinces through a network of political allies continued into Late Antiquity. The emperors Diocletian (284-305 CE) and Constantine (306-337 CE) reorganized and reinforced Rome’s southern frontiers in Arabia and Egypt. In 311, a Sabaean inscription records a Ḥimyarite embassy to Constantine, ‘Caesar, king of the North’. The leading inhabitants of the island of Divus (Soqotra?) even sent hostages to Constantine’s court (Philost. HE 2.6; 3.4; 3.6; Amm. 22.7.10). Constantine’s son, Constantius II (337-361 CE), sent a deacon, Theophil ‘the Indian’, in the (early?) 340s to the Ḥimyarites with 200 noble Cappadocian horses, money, and many other magnificent gifts, on what is described as an evangelizing mission (Philost. HE 2.6 and 3.4-6). Yet, it is more likely that the emperor intended to rebuild (or reinforce) alliances at a time when Ḥimyar had conquered Central Arabia and the Sasanians had become a major power on the Arabian Peninsula. In 356, Constantius II ruled that envoys on their way to the Aksūmites or the Ḥimyarites were not allowed to spend more than a year in Alexandria at the expense of the state (CTh 12.12.2). In fact, ships departing at yearly intervals by imperial order from the Egyptian harbour at Clysma and bringing imperial officials (logotetes) to the southern shores of the Red Sea (‘India’) are on record in the 380s (CSEL 39,116 [Petr. Diac., Liber de locis sanctis, CCSL, vol. 175, p. 101]).

Near the end of the fifth century, we find the emperor Anastasius (491-518) engaged in attempts to strengthen the Roman position in the region. He is reported to have concluded an alliance with an ally of the Himyarites in Central Arabia, and to have sent a bishop (Silvanus) to Ḥimyar in the first (or second?) decade of the sixth century, as the Himyarites had allegedly converted from Judaism to Christianity. However, soon afterwards, Byzantine relations with Ḥimyar appear to have seriously deteriorated (Martyrium of Arethas 27 [Detoraki 257-259], Malalas 18.15). The Arab conquest brought them to a permanent end.

Michael A. Speidel

References and suggested reading

• Arbach, M. & J. Schiettecatte 2016. The political map of Arabia and the Middle East in the third century AD revealed by a Sabaean inscription. AAE 27(2): 176–196.
• Arbach, M. & J. Schiettecatte 2017. Premiers échos de l’expédition d’Aelius Gallus dans la documentation sudarabique. CRAI 2017: 675–700.
• Bowersock, G. 2013. The Throne of Adulis: Red Sea Wars on the Eve of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Bowersock, G. 2019. The Nabataeans under Augustus, in A. Heller, C. Müller, A. Suspène (eds) Philorhômaios kai philhellèn. Hommage à Jean-Louis Ferrary: 225–233. Geneva: Librairie Droz.
• Edwell, P. et al. 2015. Arabs in the Conflict between Rome and Persia, AD 491–630, in G. Fisher (ed.) Arabs and Empire before Islam: 214–275. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Marek, C. 1993. Die Expedition des Aelius Gallus nach Arabien im Jahre 25 v.Chr. Chiron 23: 121–156.
• Messeri, G. 2005. Un nuovo trierarco e la presenza della flotta romana nel Mar Rosso, in F. Crevatin & G. Tedeschi (eds) Scrivere Leggere Interpretare: Studi di antichità in onore di Sergio Daris: 275–278. Trieste: Edizioni Università di Trieste.
• Nebes, N. 2009. Eine datierte nabatäisch-sabäische Inschrift (Bilingue) aus Sirwah / Jemen. Antike Welt 40(1): 52–53.
• Potts, D. 1991. Nabataean Finds from Thaj and Qatif. AAE 2: 138–144.
• Robin, C.J. 2013. À propos de Ymnt et Ymn: « nord » et « sud »,« droite » et « gauche », dans les inscriptions de l’Arabie antique, in F. Briquel-Chatonnet, C. Fauveaud & I. Gajda (eds) Entre Carthage et l’Arabie heureuse. Mélanges offerts à François Bron: 119–140. Paris: De Boccard.
• Robin, C.J. 2019. Les silences d’Aelius Gallus. L’hypothèse d’une brève occupation romaine et nabatéenne du royaume de Sabaʼ; in The State Hermitage Museum (ed.) Ex Oriente Lux. Collected papers to mark the 75th anniversary of Mikhail Borisovich Piotrovsky: 234–264. Saint Petersburg: The State Hermitage Publishers.
• Speidel, M.A. 2009. Ausserhalb des Reiches? Zu neuen lateinischen Inschriften aus Saudi Arabien und zur Ausdehnung der römischen Herrschaft am Roten Meer, in M.A. Speidel (ed.) Heer und Herrschaft im Römischen Reich der Hohen Kaiserzeit: 633–649. Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag.
• Speidel, M.A. 2015. ʼAlmaqah in Rom? Zu den Beziehungen zwischen dem kaiserzeitlichen Imperium Romanum und Südarabien im Spiegel der dokumentarischen Überlieferung. ZPE 194: 241–258.
• Speidel, M.A. 2016. Fernhandel und Freundschaft. Zu Roms amici an den Handelsrouten nach Südarabien und Indien. Orbis Terrarum 14: 155–193.
• Speidel, M.A. 2016. Die Throninschrift von Adulis und das Römische Reich am Roten Meer zu Beginn des dritten Jahrhunderts n. Chr. ZPE 200: 287–300.
• Speidel, M.A. forthcoming. Trajan and the Red Sea. In M.H. Sayar (ed.), The Roman Emperor Marcus Ulpius Traianus. Antalya: AKMED.

_{Alternate spellings: Roman, Romans, al-Rūm, al-Rūmān, al-Rūmī, al-Rûm, al-Rûmân, al-Rûmî, al-Rum, al-Ruman, al-Rumi, Rmn, Rūmān, Rûmân, Ruman, Rome, Roman Empire}